Concept skos:Concept Code PR.IR-01.6

The organisation shall ensure that its critical systems are designed to fail securely and remain protected in the event of an operational failure of a border protection device.

Also known as

skos:altLabel

Secure failure of boundary devices

Note

skos:note

The goal of this control is to ensure that critical systems remain protected and do not become exposed orvul- nerable if a firewall, proxy, or other boundary protection device fails. In OT environments, where availability and safety are paramount, systems should be designed to fail securely, for example, by defaulting to a deny-all state, isolating affected segments, or triggering alerts, so that a failure in one component does not compromise the entire system or allow unauthorised access. To achieve this goal, the following should be considered:

  • Fail-Secure Configuration Devices should be configured to default to a secure state (e.g. deny all traffic) in the event of failure, pre- venting unauthorised access or data leakage.
  • Redundancy and High Availability Redundant systems or failover mechanisms should be in place to ensure continuous protection. Avoid single points of failure, especially in OT environments where uptime is critical.
  • Regular Testing and Maintenance Failover mechanisms and secure failure configurations should be tested regularly. Maintenance should ensure devices remain in a secure and functional state.
  • Access Control Integrity Access Control Lists (ACLs) and security policies should remain protected and unaltered during failures to preserve the system’s security posture.
  • Monitoring and Alerts Real-time monitoring and alerting should be implemented to detect failures promptly and initiate corrective actions.
  • Segmentation and Isolation Network design should include segmentation and isolation to limit the impact of a failure and prevent cas- cading effects across systems. These practices align with recognised standards, including NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, NIST SP 800-53A, and IEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.2 RE 3 – Fail Close, which emphasise secure failure and resilience in critical infrastructure systems.

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Identifier (URI) http://cyfun.data.gift/data/requirement_PR_IR_01_6
All data (19 statements)

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type

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http://cyfun.data.gift/ontology#Requirement

type

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label

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PR.IR-01.6: The organisation shall ensure that its critical systems are designed to fail securely and remain protected in the event of an operational failure of a border protection device.

http://cyfun.data.gift/ontology#requirementId

PR.IR-01.6

http://cyfun.data.gift/ontology#foundIn

http://cyfun.data.gift/data/loc_CyFun2025_Booklet_ESSENTIAL_E_p135

has broader

Relates a concept to a concept that is more general in meaning.

http://cyfun.data.gift/data/subcategory_PR.IR-01

note

A general note, for any purpose.

The goal of this control is to ensure that critical systems remain protected and do not become exposed orvul- nerable if a firewall, proxy, or other boundary protection device fails. In OT environments, where availability and safety are paramount, systems should be designed to fail securely, for example, by defaulting to a deny-all state, isolating affected segments, or triggering alerts, so that a failure in one component does not compromise the entire system or allow unauthorised access. To achieve this goal, the following should be considered: • Fail-Secure Configuration Devices should be configured to default to a secure state (e.g. deny all traffic) in the event of failure, pre- venting unauthorised access or data leakage. • Redundancy and High Availability Redundant systems or failover mechanisms should be in place to ensure continuous protection. Avoid single points of failure, especially in OT environments where uptime is critical. • Regular Testing and Maintenance Failover mechanisms and secure failure configurations should be tested regularly. Maintenance should ensure devices remain in a secure and functional state. • Access Control Integrity Access Control Lists (ACLs) and security policies should remain protected and unaltered during failures to preserve the system’s security posture. • Monitoring and Alerts Real-time monitoring and alerting should be implemented to detect failures promptly and initiate corrective actions. • Segmentation and Isolation Network design should include segmentation and isolation to limit the impact of a failure and prevent cas- cading effects across systems. These practices align with recognised standards, including NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, NIST SP 800-53A, and IEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.2 RE 3 – Fail Close, which emphasise secure failure and resilience in critical infrastructure systems.

note

A general note, for any purpose.

The goal of this control is to ensure that critical systems remain protected and do not become exposed orvul- nerable if a firewall, proxy, or other boundary protection device fails. In OT environments, where availability and safety are paramount, systems should be designed to fail securely, for example, by defaulting to a deny-all state, isolating affected segments, or triggering alerts, so that a failure in one component does not compromise the entire system or allow unauthorised access. To achieve this goal, the following should be considered: - Fail-Secure Configuration Devices should be configured to default to a secure state (e.g. deny all traffic) in the event of failure, pre- venting unauthorised access or data leakage. - Redundancy and High Availability Redundant systems or failover mechanisms should be in place to ensure continuous protection. Avoid single points of failure, especially in OT environments where uptime is critical. - Regular Testing and Maintenance Failover mechanisms and secure failure configurations should be tested regularly. Maintenance should ensure devices remain in a secure and functional state. - Access Control Integrity Access Control Lists (ACLs) and security policies should remain protected and unaltered during failures to preserve the system’s security posture. - Monitoring and Alerts Real-time monitoring and alerting should be implemented to detect failures promptly and initiate corrective actions. - Segmentation and Isolation Network design should include segmentation and isolation to limit the impact of a failure and prevent cas- cading effects across systems. These practices align with recognised standards, including NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, NIST SP 800-53A, and IEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.2 RE 3 – Fail Close, which emphasise secure failure and resilience in critical infrastructure systems.

note

A general note, for any purpose.

<div><p>The goal of this control is to ensure that critical systems remain protected and do not become exposed orvul- nerable if a firewall, proxy, or other boundary protection device fails. In OT environments, where availability and safety are paramount, systems should be designed to fail securely, for example, by defaulting to a deny-all state, isolating affected segments, or triggering alerts, so that a failure in one component does not compromise the entire system or allow unauthorised access. To achieve this goal, the following should be considered:</p><ul><li>Fail-Secure Configuration Devices should be configured to default to a secure state (e.g. deny all traffic) in the event of failure, pre- venting unauthorised access or data leakage.</li><li>Redundancy and High Availability Redundant systems or failover mechanisms should be in place to ensure continuous protection. Avoid single points of failure, especially in OT environments where uptime is critical.</li><li>Regular Testing and Maintenance Failover mechanisms and secure failure configurations should be tested regularly. Maintenance should ensure devices remain in a secure and functional state.</li><li>Access Control Integrity Access Control Lists (ACLs) and security policies should remain protected and unaltered during failures to preserve the system’s security posture.</li><li>Monitoring and Alerts Real-time monitoring and alerting should be implemented to detect failures promptly and initiate corrective actions.</li><li>Segmentation and Isolation Network design should include segmentation and isolation to limit the impact of a failure and prevent cas- cading effects across systems. These practices align with recognised standards, including NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, NIST SP 800-53A, and IEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.2 RE 3 – Fail Close, which emphasise secure failure and resilience in critical infrastructure systems.</li></ul></div>

note

A general note, for any purpose.

The goal of this control is to ensure that critical systems remain protected and do not become exposed orvul- nerable if a firewall, proxy, or other boundary protection device fails. In OT environments, where availability and safety are paramount, systems should be designed to fail securely, for example, by defaulting to a deny-all state, isolating affected segments, or triggering alerts, so that a failure in one component does not compromise the entire system or allow unauthorised access. To achieve this goal, the following should be considered: - Fail-Secure Configuration Devices should be configured to default to a secure state (e.g. deny all traffic) in the event of failure, pre- venting unauthorised access or data leakage. - Redundancy and High Availability Redundant systems or failover mechanisms should be in place to ensure continuous protection. Avoid single points of failure, especially in OT environments where uptime is critical. - Regular Testing and Maintenance Failover mechanisms and secure failure configurations should be tested regularly. Maintenance should ensure devices remain in a secure and functional state. - Access Control Integrity Access Control Lists (ACLs) and security policies should remain protected and unaltered during failures to preserve the system’s security posture. - Monitoring and Alerts Real-time monitoring and alerting should be implemented to detect failures promptly and initiate corrective actions. - Segmentation and Isolation Network design should include segmentation and isolation to limit the impact of a failure and prevent cas- cading effects across systems. These practices align with recognised standards, including NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, NIST SP 800-53A, and IEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.2 RE 3 – Fail Close, which emphasise secure failure and resilience in critical infrastructure systems.

notation

A notation, also known as classification code, is a string of characters such as "T58.5" or "303.4833" used to uniquely identify a concept within the scope of a given concept scheme.

PR.IR-01.6

alternative label

skos:prefLabel, skos:altLabel and skos:hiddenLabel are pairwise disjoint properties.

Secure failure of boundary devices

preferred label

A resource has no more than one value of skos:prefLabel per language tag, and no more than one value of skos:prefLabel without language tag.

The organisation shall ensure that its critical systems are designed to fail securely and remain protected in the event of an operational failure of a border protection device.

is in scheme

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http://cyfun.data.gift/data/CyFun2025

is in scheme

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http://cyfun.data.gift/data/CyFun2025_delta_IMPORTANT_to_ESSENTIAL

is in scheme

Relates a resource (for example a concept) to a concept scheme in which it is included.

http://cyfun.data.gift/data/CyFun2025_ESSENTIAL

http://cyfun.data.gift/ontology#level

http://cyfun.data.gift/data/level_ESSENTIAL

triple count

The number of triples associated with the subject.

17

in dataset

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http://data.gift/d/datasets/69E8863AA6CE46D9ACD13109

Resultaten 1 - 19 of 19

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